MAKING THE LAW EXPLICIT THE NORMATIVITY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION2025|PDF|Epub|mobi|kindle电子书版本百度云盘下载

MAKING THE LAW EXPLICIT THE NORMATIVITY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATIONPDF格式电子书版下载

注意：本站所有压缩包均有解压码： 点击下载压缩包解压工具

Introduction1

Ⅰ.The Doctrine of the Limits of the Wording4

A. Interpretation as a Legal Method4

B. Judicial Development of the Law5

C. Why the Differentiation Matters6

Ⅱ.Interpretation and Invention in English Legal Reasoning7

A. Statutory Interpretation and Democracy7

（ⅰ） The Purposive Versus the Literal Approach7

（ⅱ） Law-Applying Versus Law-Making9

（ⅲ） The Missing Method: Judicial Development of the Law12

B. Human Rights Act: What Is Possible?13

C. Result14

Ⅲ.Towards a Common European Approach15

Ⅳ.The Possibility of the Rule of Law Defended18

Ⅴ.The Sceptical Challenge: Indeterminacy and Vagueness19

A. The Concept of Indeterminacy20

B. Vagueness as Boundarylessness20

（ⅰ） Higher-order Vagueness21

（ⅱ） The Significance of Interpretation in the Law22

C. Scepticism in Law22

Ⅵ.The Rationality and Objectivity of Legal Reasoning23

A. Justification, Rationality and Legitimacy24

B. The Dworkin-Fish Controversy25

C. ‘B’ Semantics versus ‘KP’ Semantics26

D. The Objectivity of Law Defended27

Ⅶ.At a Glance27

A. General Approach27

B. Chapter 128

C. Chapter 229

D. Chapter 331

Chapter 1:The Doctrine of the Limits of the Wording33

Ⅰ.The Limits of the Wording in Hermeneutic Legal Theory33

A. The Reception of Ontological Hermeneutics in Legal Theory33

(ⅰ)The Limits of the Wording and Pre-Judgements35

（a） Ontological Prerequisites for the Understanding of Normative Texts35

（b） Significance for the Application of Law in General36

（c） Significance for the Limits of the Wording37

（ⅱ）Limits of the Wording and Typology40

（ⅲ）The Limits of the Wording and the Analogicity of Language42

B. Hermeneutics and Legal Interpretation43

Ⅱ.The Limits of the Wording in Analytic Legal Theory44

A. The Clarification of the Limits of the Wording by Koch,RuBmann, and Herberger44

（ⅰ）Establishing and Assigning Meaning45

（ⅱ）Classification of Unclear Usage Rules46

（a） Ambiguity47

（b） Inconsistency47

（c） Vagueness48

（ⅲ）The Limits of the Wording According to Koch,Ru Bmann, and Herberger48

B. The Role of the Limits of the Wording in Alexy’s Theory of Legal Argumentation50

（ⅰ） The Discursive Character of Interpretation50

（ⅱ） Main Features of the Theory of Legal Argumentation51

（a） Internal Justification and the Word Usage Rule51

（b） External Justification and Semantic Arguments52

Ⅲ.The Deconstructivistic Challenge of the Structuring Legal Theory54

A. Basic Premises of Structuring Legal Theory54

B. Criticism of New Hermeneutics56

C. Criticism of the Theory of Legal Reasoning According to Koch and RufBmann56

D. Criticism of Alexy’s Theory of Legal Argumentation58

E. Structuring Legal Theory and the Limits of the Wording59

（ⅰ）The Limits of the Wording as a Result of the Concretisation of Rules59

（ⅱ）Binding Effects of Legal Culture60

（ⅲ）The Limits of the Wording as the Limits of the Normative Program62

（ⅳ）The Role of the Limits of the Normative Program63

F Structuring Legal Theory—Summary63

Ⅳ.The Results of the First Chapter64

A. State of Research64

（ⅰ）The Hermeneutic Position65

（a） Pre-Judgements and Typology65

（b） Arguments in Support of the Hermeneutic Position65

（1） Argument of Ontological Hermeneutics65

（2） Argument of Analogicity66

（3） Argument of Procedural Correctness66

（4） Argument of Normative Necessity66

（ⅱ）The Analytic Position66

（a） Establishing and Assigning Meaning66

（b） Arguments for the Analytic Viewpoint67

（1） Argument of Clear Cases67

（2） Argument of the Empirical Discernibility of Meaning67

（3） Argument of Possible Corrections68

（ⅲ）The Structuring Legal Theory Position68

（a） Putting Rules in Specific Terms and the Limits of the Normative Program68

（b） Arguments in Support of Structuring Legal Theory68

（1） Argument of the Indefiniteness of the Legal Text68

（2） Argument of Legal Culture68

（ⅳ）Arguments Against the Limits of the Wording69

（a） Argument of Practical Ineffectiveness69

（b） Argument of Necessary Failure69

（c） Argument of the Lacking Normative Necessity69

（d） Argument of Reversal69

（e） The Language Game Argument70

（1） Argument of Openness70

（2） Argument of Innovation70

（3） Argument of Context Dependency70

（4） Argument of Circularity70

（f） Argument that Meaning Remains Unclarified71

（1） Argument of Objectivism71

（2） Argument of Features Semantics71

（3） Argument of the Incorrect Reception of the Speech Act Theory71

（4） Argument of Excessive Commitment71

（5） Argument of the Impossibility of the Empirical Determination of Meaning71

B. Criticism72

（ⅰ）Analytic Versus Post-Positivistic Legal Theory72

（ⅱ）A Critical Look at Structuring Legal Theory73

（a） The Basic Norm74

（b） Circularity75

（c） Normal and Exceptional Cases76

（d） Commitment to the Majority Opinion77

（e） Inconsistency78

（f） Concluding Remarks79

（ⅲ）Controversial Issues81

Chapter 2: Normativity and Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning87

Ⅰ.Introduction87

A. Meaning Scepticism and the Indeterminacy Thesis87

B. Meaning as a Problem of the Philosophy of Language89

C. Language-Philosophical Theories of Meaning90

（ⅰ）Classification in Categories91

（a） Referent, Idea, and Behaviour91

（b） Realism and Anti-Realism93

（c） Functions of Language94

（ⅱ）Significance for the Limits of the Wording94

D. An Integrative Theory of Meaning94

Ⅱ.The Normativity of Linguistic Meaning96

A. The Concept of Semantic Normativity96

（ⅰ）The General Thesis of Normativity96

（ⅱ）The Three Conditions for Normativity Theories98

（a） The Condition of Anti-Reductionist Supervenience98

（b） The Condition of Internality99

（c） The Condition of Possible Semantic Mistakes100

（ⅲ）Four Strategies of Arguing Semantic Normativity100

（a） Normativity and Truth101

（b） Normativity and Internal Relation103

（c） Normativity and Rationality104

（d） Normativity and Regularity106

（1） Semantic Normativity According to the Rule Model106

（2） Objection of the Analytic Priority of Individualism107

（3） Objection of the Incoherence of Prescriptivity and Constitutivity109

（ⅳ）Normativity and Connection Thesis114

B. Brandom’s Linguistic Normativity115

（ⅰ）Normative Pragmatics117

（a） Anthropologic Basis and Implicit Normativity117

（b） Normative Attitudes and Sanctions119

（c） Result: Principle of Instituting Norms through Social Practice122

（ⅱ）Inferential Semantics122

（a） The Pragmatic Priority of Propositional Meaning122

（b） Meaning and Material Inference123

（c） Result: The Principle of the Normative Significance of Conceptual Systems125

（ⅲ）Interlocking Normative Pragmatics and Inferential Semantics in a Discursive Practice Model126

（a） Commitment and Entitlement as Deontic Statuses127

（b） Three Types and Three Dimensions of Inferential Structure129

（c） The Deontic Score-keeping Model131

（d） Propositional Meaning in Discursive Practice133

（ⅳ）Theory of the Meaning of Subsentential Expressions134

（a） Substitution135

（b） Anaphora139

（c） Results of the Theory of the Meaning of Subsentential Expressions140

C. Objections against the Theory of Normativity141

（ⅰ）Kripke’s Theory of Rule-Following142

（a） Kripke’s Sceptical Paradox142

（b） Kripke’s Sceptical Solution145

（c） Criticism145

（1） Normativity and Agreement146

（2） Naturalism,Reductionism,and Regress147

（ⅱ）The Objection of Semantic Holism151

（a） The Doctrine of Semantic Holism151

（b） WVO Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism152

（c） Criticism156

（1） The Central Chains of Argument157

（2） Reversibility and the Status of Logical Laws158

（3） Dummett’s Argument of the Possibility of Communication165

（4） Canonical Standards in Moderate Holism166

（ⅲ）The Objection of the Impossibility of Analyticity167

（a） Analyticity,Aprioricity,Modality168

（b） WVO Quine’s Word and Object169

（c） Criticism173

（1） Relativity and Normativity174

（2） Analyticity’s Triadic Relativity175

（3） OLOL Analyticity179

D. Result for the Normativity of Linguistic Meaning180

Ⅲ.The Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning181

A. The Concept of Objectivity181

B. Objectivity as Reference183

（ⅰ）Reference and Inference184

（ⅱ）Frege’s Analysis of Picking out Objects185

（ⅲ）Reference and de re Ascriptions187

（ⅳ）Doxastic Gap and Objectivity189

（ⅴ)Reference and Interpersonal Anaphora191

C. Objectivity as Intersubjectivity192

（ⅰ）The Social Perspectival Character of Conceptual Content193

（ⅱ）The Paradox of Relative Objectivity193

D. Objections to the Objectivity Theory196

（ⅰ）Quine’s Objection of the Indeterminism of Reference197

（ⅱ）The Objection of the Special Role Played by Theoretical Terms197

（ⅲ）Wright’s Objection of the Impossibility of a Conventional Objectivity Theory198

（a） Subjective Attitude and Objective Status199

（b） The Possibility of Communal Errors200

（ⅳ）The Objection of Incompatibility201

（ⅴ)The Objection that There Is No Objective World203

E. Conclusion on the Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning205

Ⅳ.The Results of the Second Chapter207

A. The Three Dimensions of Linguistic Meaning207

B. The Universality Challenge208

C. Scope and Role of Language-Analytical Discourse208

Chapter 3: Semantic Normativity in the Law211

Ⅰ.Addressing the Three Central Issues211

A. Clear and Unclear Cases212

（ⅰ）The Relevance in Legal Theory of the Distinction Between Clear and Unclear Cases212

（ⅱ）The Concept of the Clear Case212

（a） Semantic Clarity and Juridical Clarity212

（b） Constitutive Clarity and Epistemic Clarity213

（ⅲ）Semantic Clarity in Accordance with the Model of Deontic Scorekeeping213

（a） Semantic Clarity in the First Inferential Dimension214

（b） Semantic Clarity in the Second Inferential Dimension215

（c） Semantic Clarity in the Third Inferential Dimension215

（d） Result215

（ⅳ）The Existence of Semantically-Clear Cases216

（ⅴ）Limitations in Hard Cases218

（ⅵ）Result on the First Issue218

B. The Epistemic Openness of the Meaning of Norms219

（ⅰ）Rejection of the Critical Arguments220

（ⅱ）Confirmation of the Argument of Epistemic Openness222

（a） Semantic Normativity and Rules for the Use of Words222

（b） Semantic Object-Relatedness and the Theory of Meaning of Koch and of RuBmann224

（c） The Objection of the Reification of the Law226

（ⅲ）Result on the Second Issue227

C. The Objectivity of the Meaning of Norms229

D. Result Regarding the Three Central Issues229

Ⅱ. The Theory of the Limits of the Wording230

A. The Relationship Between Semantic Clarity andSemantically-Unclear Meaning230

B. The Limits of the Wording with Constitutive Semantic Clarity231

（ⅰ）The Function of Rules for the Use of Words in the Internal Justification231

（ⅱ）Semantic Limits in the First Linguistic Dimension233

（a） The Four Limits of Inferential Relations233

（1） Conditional Commitment Limit233

（2） Conditional Entitlement Limit236

（3） Consequential Commitment Limit238

（4） Consequential Entitlement Limit242

（5） The System and Function of the Inferential Limits243

（b） The Inferential Limits at Subsentential Level248

（ⅲ）Semantic Limits in the Second Linguistic Dimension250

（ⅳ）Semantic Limits in the Third Linguistic Dimension252

（ⅴ）The System of Semantic Limits254

C. The Limits of the Wording with Constitutive Semantically-Unclear Meaning255

（ⅰ）The Classification of Semantically-Unclear Cases in Inferential Semantics256

（a） The Concept of Vagueness256

（b） The Concept of Ambiguity262

（c） The Concept of Inconsistency263

（d） The Concept of Evaluative Openness263

（e） Result on the Classification of Unclear Cases264

（ⅱ）Semantic Limits in the Case of Vagueness265

（a） Connection Between the Three-Candidate Model and the Model of Rules for the Use of Words265

（1） Preliminary Considerations265

（2） The Scheme of the Positive Limits of the Wording267

（3） The Scheme of the Negative Limits of the Wording268

（4） Summary269

（b） The System of Semantic Limits with Vagueness270

（ⅲ）Semantic Limits with Ambiguity270

（ⅳ）Semantic Limits with Evaluatively-Open Concepts272

D. Result on the Theory of the Limits of the Wording273

Ⅲ.The Results of the Third Chapter274

A. Results274

B. The Rehabilitation of Semantic Argumentation in the Law276

C. The Objectivity of Legal Rulings278

Bibliography283

Index301