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PART Ⅰ EFFICIENT LIABILITY RULES3

1 Strict liability versus negligence&Hans-Bernd Sch？fer and Frank Müller-Langer3

1.1 Introduction3

1.2 Unilateral accidents5

1.2.1 Rule of no liability6

1.2.2 Negligence6

1.2.3 Relaxing assumptions7

1.2.4 Strict liability10

1.2.5 Relaxing assumptions for strict liability10

1.2.6 Liability and uncertain legal standards of due care13

1.3 Bilateral accidents15

1.3.1 The 'cheapest cost avoider'16

1.3.2 Rule of no liability17

1.3.3 Negligence17

Simple negligence17

Negligence with the defence of contributory negligence18

Comparative negligence rule18

1.3.4 Strict liability19

Simple strict liability19

Strict division of losses19

Strict liability with the defence of contributory negligence20

Strict liability with the defence of relative negligence20

1.3.5 Relaxing assumptions20

1.4 Litigation costs24

1.5 The decentralisation effect of strict liability and negligence24

1.6 The information-generating consequence of negligence27

1.6.1 Negligence generates public information on safety technology27

1.6.2 Information generated by the negligence rule alleviates principal-agent problems28

1.7 Strict liability versus negligence if the injurer's wealth is lower than the damage29

1.8 Liability and contracts30

1.9 Negligence under the disguise of strict liability,liability for design defects31

1.10 Multiple tortfeasors32

1.11 Risk aversion, liability law and insurance33

1.12 Relaxing behavioural assumptions of rational choice35

1.13 Comparing strict liability and negligence36

Bibliography39

2 Contributory and comparative negligence in the law and economics literature&Mireia Artigot i Golobardes and Fernando Gómez Pomar46

2.1 Introduction46

2.2 The world of negligence47

2.3 Contributory and comparative negligence: concepts and evolution48

2.3.1 Contributory negligence: origin, development and later trend towards comparative negligence48

2.3.2 Comparative negligence: pure and modified forms52

2.4 Incentives to take care53

2.4.1 Initial literature: contributory negligence and the least-cost avoider53

2.4.2 Haddock and Curran and Shavell: the equivalence between contributory and comparative negligence58

2.4.3 Relaxing some of the initial assumptions and moving away from first-best analysis59

2.4.3.1 Evidentiary uncertainty and court error59

2.4.3.2 Stochastic due care and the losses of injurers and victims66

2.4.3.3 Heterogeneous agents67

2.4.3.4 Asymmetric information and liability rules as mechanisms to reveal information70

2.4.3.5 Convergence to equilibrium72

2.5 Other grounds for criticism of comparative negligence73

Ability to apportion negligence73

Risk coverage73

The role of jurors74

The costly mechanism of adjusting the defendant's liability share both with respect to the plaintiff and with respect to the other defendants74

2.6 Empirical studies on the performance of contributory and comparative negligence rules, and on pure comparative versus modified comparative negligence74

2.7 Conclusions77

Bibliography77

PART Ⅱ CAUSATION AND MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS83

3 Causation and foreseeability&Omri Ben-Shahar83

3.1 Introduction83

3.2 Causation in early economic analysis of law84

3.3 Prospective causation85

3.4 Causation and socially optimal care86

3.5 Causation under strict liability87

3.5.1 The effect of the scope of liability on the level of care87

3.5.2 The effect of the scope of liability on the level of activity88

3.6 Causation under the negligence rule89

3.6.1 The determination of the optimal standard of care89

3.6.2 The effect of the scope of liability on the actual level of care89

3.6.3 The scope of liability in an imperfectly operating negligence system89

3.7 Uncertainty over causation91

3.8 The case for threshold probability rules92

3.9 The case for the proportional liability rule93

3.10 Risk-based liability and safety regulation96

3.11 Causal apportionment among joint tortfeasors97

3.12 Foreseeability in tort law100

3.13 Foreseeability in contract law102

3.14 Causation and litigation costs104

Bibliography105

4 Joint and several liability&Lewis A. Kornhauser and Richard L. Revesz109

4.1 Introduction109

4.2 Legal regimes109

4.3 Settlements110

4.3.1 Several only liability112

4.3.2 Joint and several liability with two defendants113

4.3.2.1 Independent probabilities113

4.3.2.2 Perfectly correlated probabilities115

4.3.2.3 The effects of limited solvency115

4.3.3 Joint and several liability with n ＞ 2 defendants117

4.4 Deterrence: opening remarks119

4.4.1 Full solvency120

4.4.1.1 Negligence120

4.4.1.2 Strict liability122

4.4.2 Limited, exogenously determined solvency122

4.4.3 Endogenous solvency124

4.5 Fairness: several remarks125

4.6 Size of the plaintiffs recovery126

4.7 Division of the plaintiff's recovery126

4.8 The effects of settlements127

4.9 Division of the burden of insolvency128

4.10 Insurance under joint and several liability129

4.11 Conclusions130

References130

5 Vicarious and corporate civil liability&Reinier H. Kraakman134

5.1 Introduction134

5.2 The standard case for vicarious liability135

5.3 Factors militating against strict vicarious liability137

5.4 The interaction between principal and agent liability140

5.5 Negligence and composite vicarious liability regimes142

5.6 Reaching beyond the principal: alternative liability targets144

5.7 Corporate civil liability versus criminal liability145

Bibliography147

6 Tort Damages&Louis T. Visscher153

6.1 Introduction153

6.2 Full compensation of harm?156

6.3 Pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses158

6.4 Assessment of losses159

6.5 Damages for fatal accidents160

6.5.1 Introduction160

6.5.2 Optimal amount that injurers should pay160

6.5.3 Optimal amount that the surviving relatives should receive162

6.6 Compensation for nonpecuniary losses?163

6.7 Uncompensated losses165

6.8 Punitive damages166

6.9 Pure economic loss168

6.10 Harm to the victim or gain to the injurer?170

6.11 Future losses171

6.12 Role of defendants' wealth172

6.13 Mitigation of losses173

6.14 Judicial moderation, limitation of damages and insolvency174

6.15 Loss ofachance176

6.16 Multiple tortfeasors178

6.17 Secondary accident cost reduction180

6.18 Empirical research181

6.19 Conclusion182

Bibliography184

7 Pure economic loss&Jef De Mot201

7.1 Introduction201

7.2 A taxonomy of pure economic loss cases202

7.3 The insufficiency of explanations not based on efficiency203

7.4 Private versus social loss204

7.5 Private loss, social loss and market structure206

7.6 Strict liability versus negligence207

7.6.1 Unilateral precaution accidents207

7.6.2 Bilateral and trilateral precaution accidents208

7.7 Intentional versus negligent torts209

7.8 Economic analysis of the various types of cases209

7.8.1 Ricochet loss cases209

7.8.2 Transferred loss cases209

7.8.3 Closure of public service and infrastructures cases210

7.8.4 Flawed professional advice cases210

7.9 Conclusion211

Bibliography211

8 Non pecuniary losses&Siewert D. Lindenbergh and Peter P.M. van Kippersluis215

8.1 Introduction215

8.2 Tort law and economics216

8.3 Why should non pecuniary losses be compensated?217

8.3.1 Why compensation?217

8.3.2 Prevention218

8.3.3 Efficient distribution and insurance220

8.4 Valuation of non pecuniary loss223

8.5 Risks of high awards224

8.6 Conclusions225

Bibliography226

9 Punitive damages&A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell228

9.1 Introduction228

9.2 Optimal damages when injurers are found liable for sure: the basic theory of deterrence229

9.3 Optimal damages when injurers might escape liability231

9.4 Optimal damages when harm is underestimated232

9.5 Optimal damages when injurers' gains are socially illicit233

9.6 Optimal damages when parties can bargain and transact in the marketplace234

9.7 Optimal damages and punishment235

9.8 Optimal damages in the light of both objectives237

9.9 Extensions of the analysis238

Bibliography242

PART Ⅳ SPECIFIC CASES247

10 Environmental liability&Michael Faure247

10.1 Introduction247

10.2 Goals of environmental liability249

10.3 Coase249

10.4 Negligence versus strict liability252

10.5 The influence of regulation on liability253

10.5.1 Criteria for regulation253

10.5.2 Necessity of the combination253

10.5.3 Violation of regulation and liability254

10.5.4 Compliance with regulation and liability254

10.5.5 Liability and incentive-based instruments255

10.6 Damage and damages255

10.7 Moving beyond the original polluter257

10.7.1 Causal uncertainty257

10.7.2 Joint and several liability258

10.7.3 Channelling of liability260

10.7.4 Liability of lenders and producers260

10.8 Latency and retroactive liability261

10.8.1 Retroactive liability?261

10.8.2 Changes in the level of care262

10.9 Insurance of environmental liability263

10.9.1 Moral hazard264

10.9.2 Adverse selection265

10.9.3 Latency and retroactive liability265

10.9.4 Causal uncertainty266

10.9.5 Compulsory insurance266

10.9.6 Disaster insurance267

10.10 Other compensation mechanisms267

10.11 Environmental federalism and environmental liability269

10.12 The nuclear risk270

10.13 Marine oil pollution272

10.14 Concluding remarks274

Bibliography277

11 Products liability&Mark A. Geistfeld287

11.1 Introduction287

11.2 The basic model for analyzing the efficiency properties of contracting and tort liability289

11.3 The significance of imperfectly competitive markets290

11.4 The role of consumer information about product risk291

11.5 Do consumers undervalue product safety?292

11.6 Informational mechanisms in product markets293

11.7 Product warranties295

11.8 Insurance costs and warranty liability297

11.9 The regulatory problem298

11.10 The choice between negligence and strict liability300

11.11 Empirical studies of the effect of seller liability on product safety301

11.12 The impact of tort liability on innovation and productivity304

11.13 Products liability and the market for liability insurance306

11.14 Introduction to the main doctrines of products liability308

11.15 The requirement of defect309

11.16 Construction or manufacturing defects310

11.17 Design defects311

11.18 Warning defects313

11.19 Extended seller liability315

11.20 Defenses based on consumer conduct316

11.21 The enforceability of contractual waivers of seller liability316

11.22 Bystander injuries317

11.23 Compensatory damages318

11.24 Punitive damages319

11.25 The evolution of products liability, and the evolution of economics320

Bibliography321

12 Medical malpractice&Steve Boccara341

12.1 Introduction341

12.2 The development of medical malpractice liability342

12.3 The economic analysis of medical malpractice liability343

12.3.1 The nature of the doctor-patient relationship343

12.3.2 Incentive and compensation344

12.3.3 Medical malpractice and the law and economics approach346

12.3.4 Tort law, regulation and insurance347

12.4 The main topics of medical malpractice349

12.4.1 Negligence versus strict liability349

12.4.2 Standard of care351

12.4.3 Is the tort system relevant?351

12.4.4 Defensive medicine354

12.5 The medical malpractice crisis356

12.5.1 The context356

12.5.2 Malpractice insurance and the underwriting cycle359

12.6 Some proposals to end the medical malpractice crisis360

12.6.1 Tort reforms360

12.6.2 Shifting toward a no-fault system362

12.7 Conclusions364

Bibliography365

PART Ⅴ ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEMS377

13 Tort law and liability insurance&Gerhard Wagner377

13.1 Introduction377

13.2 The economic rationale of insurance377

13.2.1 The demand for insurance377

13.2.1.1 Risk aversion377

13.2.1.2 Consequences for the deterrence function of tort law379

13.2.1.3 Insuring liability for fault380

13.2.1.4 Non-pecuniary losses381

13.2.2 The supply of insurance382

13.2.2.1 Pooling: the law of large numbers382

13.2.2.2 Subdivision of risk383

13.3 Compensation of victims as a purpose of liability insurance?384

13.4 Economic problems of liability insurance386

13.4.1 Asymmetric information and imperfect insurance386

13.4.2 Adverse selection388

13.4.3 Moral hazard389

13.4.3.1 Effect: destruction of incentives generated by tort law389

13.4.3.2 Source: informational asymmetry390

13.4.3.3 Remedy: partial insurance391

13.4.3.4 Activity levels392

13.5 Economic virtues of liability insurance393

13.5.1 Unlimited liability on paper, limited liability in reality393

13.5.2 The pervasiveness of limited liability394

13.5.3 Limited liability and the incentive to take care394

13.5.4 Limited liability and the incentive to insure395

13.5.5 Limited liability and activity levels397

13.5.6 Compulsory insurance397

13.5.7 Alternative means398

13.6 The limits of insurance: insurability399

13.6.1 Uninsurability as an argument in political discourse399

13.6.2 Elements of insurability399

13.6.3 Insurability as a flexible concept400

13.7 The impact of liability insurance on tort law401

Bibliography402

14 No-fault compensation systems&Karine Fiore406

14.1 Introduction406

14.2 No-fault systems: the priority given to the protection of victims407

14.2.1 Definition of no-fault systems407

14.2.2 The theoretical rationale of no-fault systems409

14.2.2.1 Higher compensation409

14.2.2.2 Lower transaction costs409

14.2.2.3 Lower insurance premiums410

14.2.3 Disadvantages of no-fault systems411

14.2.4 Examples and empirical evaluations412

14.2.4.1 Automobile insurance412

14.2.4.2 A universal no-fault system: the case of New Zealand413

14.3 No-fault versus strict liability systems416

14.3.1 Definition of the strict liability system416

14.3.2 The advantages of strict liability416

14.4 The efficiency of compensation systems: the necessary conditions418

14.4.1 Unlimited liability/compensation amounts418

14.4.2 Safety regulation420

14.4.3 Compulsory insurance421

14.5 Examples of compensation systems (based on strict liability) for catastrophic risks422

14.5.1 Compensation for nuclear accidents423

14.5.2 Compensation for marine oil pollution accidents425

14.6 Conclusions427

Bibliography427

PART Ⅵ OTHER PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW435

15 Harmonizing tort law: a comparative tort law and economics analysis&Willem H. van Boom435

15.1 Introduction435

15.2 Tort law as domestic preference436

15.3 Domestic preferences and the market for tort law systems438

15.4 Differences in European tort law systems and the harmonization of tort law439

15.4.1 General439

15.4.2 Economic analysis in the harmonization debate440

15.4.3 Tort law an obstacle for the mobility of persons and goods?442

15.4.4 Regulatory competition versus culture443

15.4.5 Cross-border externalities argument444

15.4.6 Race to the bottom argument445

15.4.7 Reduction of(transaction) cost446

Bibliography447

PART Ⅶ EMPIRICS453

16 Empirics of tort&Ben C.J. van Velthoven453

16.1 Introduction453

16.2 Prerequisites for empirical analysis456

16.2.1 Variation456

16.2.2 Data458

16.2.3 Methods459

16.3 The tort litigation system461

16.3.1 Base rate462

16.3.2 Claiming rate463

16.3.3 Disposition of claims465

16.3.4 Punitive damages468

16.3.5 Administrative costs470

16.4 Effects of tort reform on litigation and insurance471

16.5 Safety effects473

16.5.1 Automobile accidents474

No-fault474

Other changes in liability rules477

Other safety measures477

16.5.2 Industrial accidents479

From negligence to workers' compensation480

Trends in workers' compensation480

16.5.3 Product liability482

Empirical findings483

Asbestos484

16.5.4 Medical malpractice485

Defensive medicine486

16.6 Cost-benefit analysis488

Bibliography490

Index499